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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of the 2003 French pension reform
on hiring, firing and employment rates among older workers. This
reform increased the mandatory retirement age and simultaneously it
set a tax levied on early retirement windows payed by firms to their
older workers, to encourage them to leave their job early. We use a
matching model with endogenous job destruction extended to account
for a mandatory retirement age and we calibrate the model with data
drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys for the years 2001 and
2002. We show that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement
raises job separation rates, which partially offsets its positive effect on
job finding rates. Consequently, the combination of an increase in the
retirement age and a taxation on early retirement windows may have
perverse effects on the employment rate among older workers.
Keywords : Delaying retirement, early retirement windows, job match-
ing models, employment protection
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, most European countries experienced an ageing
of their population due to a fall in fertility rates since 1970 in a setting of
steadily increasing life expectancy. Furthermore during the same period,
the employment rate among workers aged 55-64 years has been decreasing,
leading to an important rise in dependency rates and putting therefore a
strong pressure on budgetary balance of PAYG retirement schemes.
The creation of early retirement schemes in the 1970’s may be an expla-
nation of the fall in employment of elderly observed in Europe during the
same period. Zaidmann (2000) shows that in France these schemes led to a
consensus between older workers, firms and government. This phenomenon
may be due to two main reasons. First, early retirement schemes were partly
financed by the government so they could be viewed by firms as a layoff sub-
sidy (Hutchens, 1999, Tuulia and Uusitalo 2005). Second, the government
encouraged early retirement to make more room for youngsters in the labor
market in a setting of high youth unemployment (Zaidman, 2000).
Nevertheless thirty years later, since the employment rate among workers
aged more than 55 in France was one of the lower in the European Union
(29.9% in France with respect to an European average of 37.8%1), the French
government implemented important changes to constrain early retirement.
These changes aimed simultaneously at tightening the access conditions to
early retirement schemes for workers and firms and at increasing the share
of early retirement expenses charged to employers. However, in spite of the
increase of early retirement costs for firms, employers continue to encourage
their older workers to leave early their job, offering them generous financial
incentives called ”early retirement windows”. In the face of this widespread
phenomenon, notably in the case of big firms, the French government set in
2003 a tax levied on the amount of early retirement windows payed by firms.
The tax rate amounted to 23.85% in 2003 and in 2008 it raised to 50%. In
addition, to prevent firms from pushing their older workers into retirement
too early, the 2003 reform also led to an increase in the mandatory retirement
age. Initially, this age was 60 which means that when a worker reached 60
and if his insurance period was sufficient to allow him to draw a full pension,
an employer could push him into retirement paying him a low retirement
allowance. In 2003 this age has been rising to 65 and since 2008 it has been
setting to 70.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the effect of the combination of
these two reforms on the hiring rate, the firing rate and the employment rate
1Source: Eurostat
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among older workers. The effect of an increase in legal retirement age on
employment among older workers has been already considered in the litera-
ture. Previous studies point out that delaying retirement may have a positive
”horizon effect” on job creation, when labor is viewed as a quasi-fixed factor
that implies fixed costs (Oi, 1962). These costs result from either a bilateral
monopoly problem (Hutchens, 1986), or from an accumulation of specific
human capital through training (cf Hashimoto 1981) and imply that firms
are more reluctant to hire a worker close to the retirement age. Furthermore
focussing on job destruction, Aubert et al. (2006) show that there is an age-
bias technological change, so employers are less likely to keep an older worker
in the case of a shock on his job, if his employment duration is too short.
Extending the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in order to account
for the life cycle of the worker with a bounded retirement age, Che´ron et
al. (2007) draw similar conclusions and argue that an increase in retirement
age may have a positive effect on hiring rates and may reduce firing rates by
lengthening the employment duration of older workers.
In addition, the effect of an increase in age-specific employment protection
on employment has also been considered in previous literature. Investigat-
ing the effect of the Contribution Delalande, a tax payed by firms who fire
workers aged more than 50, Behaghel (2007) shed a new light on a potential
perverse effect of such a partial employment protection on the hiring rate of
the targeted age group of workers and also on the firing rate of the previous
cohort of workers. Indeed, although this tax aims at discouraging firms from
laying older workers off, firms may have interest to fire their workers before
they reach the threshold age and they may be reluctant to hire workers just
below this age. Studying empirically the magnitude of these effects using
Labor Force Surveys from 1982 to 2002, Behaghel et al. (2008) show that
the tax has a strong negative effect on the hiring probability of unemployed
workers in the protected age group.
While the effects of an increase in legal retirement age and of an age-
specific tax on firing on employment have already been studied separately,
there does not exist as far as we know a paper that examines the impact of
the combination of both these reforms on elderly employment. Borrowing
the Behaghel’s theoretical framework (2007), we distinguish two age groups
of workers, the middle-age and the older workers, considering that middle-
age workers are protected according to the French Employment Protection
Legislation, while older workers are protected by a tax levied on early retire-
ment windows offered by their employer to encourage them to leave their job
early.
The key result of this study can be summarized as follows : in the case
of a high tax rate, delaying retirement may raise the separation rate for the
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protected group of workers through an ”impatience effect”. Indeed, in the
case of a negative productivity shock on a job filled by an older worker, post-
poning retirement may encourage an employer to offer his worker a generous
early retirement window to force him to leave, rather than waiting for him
to reach the new mandatory retirement age. So, in this paper we determine
a critical value of the tax rate, above which delaying retirement may raise
job separations for older workers. The impatience effect may partially offset
the positive horizon effect exerted by a rise in the retirement age on the hir-
ing probability of older workers. In other words, when the government set
a tax levied on early retirement windows it attenuates the positive effect of
delaying retirement on job finding rates of the protected age group.
In addition, as an increase in the retirement age reduces transitions
from unemployment to retirement, it exerts a negative effect on employment
among older workers if the horizon effect is not sufficiently strong. Conse-
quently, the higher the tax rate on early retirement windows, the lower the
horizon effect and the stronger the negative effect of postponing retirement
on employment among the protected age group.
Calibrating our model using data drawn from the French Labor Force
Survey for the years 2001-2002, we provide a numerical illustration of these
findings. We show that the change in the job separation rate for older workers
after an increase in the retirement age strongly depends on the tax rate.
Consequently, the effect of delaying retirement on employment among the
protected age group is sensitive to the level of taxation of early retirement
windows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
using the data drawn from the two waves of the European survey SHARE
(Survey on Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe), we study to what ex-
tent older workers who retired early have been given early retirement windows
from their employer. Then in section 3, we describe in detail the theoretical
model, following the specification of Behaghel (2007). In section 4 we present
our main theoretical findings on the effect of an increase in the mandatory re-
tirement age on hiring rates and firing rates of middle-age and older workers
in a setting of partial employment protection. In the section 5, we describe
our quantitative analysis based on the French Labor Force Surveys for the
years 2001 and 2002 and we present our results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Early retirement windows: a new pattern
in Europe
While the incidence of early retirement windows has been already considered
in the American case2, too few studies examine this pattern in the Euro-
pean case. Using data from the 1997 International Social Survey Program,
Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2007) investigate the incidence of involuntary early
retirement for 19 countries3, asking retired respondents if they retired early
”by choice” or ”not by choice”. Their analysis covers the early retirement
of individuals aged between 45 and 64 who retired between 1983 and 1997.
Providing some descriptive statistics, they show that in some European coun-
tries like Germany or Portugal, more than half of all retired respondents state
that they retire early ”not by choice”. In France this proportion amounts to
41%, which is also very high.
However, a dummy equal to one if the individual reports that he retires
early ”not by choice” does not provide some accurate information about the
motivations of his forced early retirement. In addition, this variable raises
an empirical issue. Indeed, a respondent may mention that he retired ”not
by choice” to legitimate his own choice, leading to a potential justification
bias (Parsons, 1980. To address both these issues we use the two first waves
2004 and 2006 of the Survey on Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE). This data provides some information for eleven countries4 on the
factors that led respondents to retire. We proceed in two steps. In the first
step, we include in our sample only retired respondents aged between 57 and
69 in 2006, who were not entitled to a public or private pension when they
left their activity. We obtain a sample made up of 1735 individuals. We
remark in the table 1 that in Europe early exit stems from 3 main reasons.
First, almost one third of the sample report that they left their job after
they had been given early retirement windows from their employer. Second,
around 15% of the respondents mention that they had been laid off. Third,
around 30% of the individuals report that they left early their job due to
their bad health status.
When we examine the self-reported reasons for early retirement by coun-
tries in the figure 1 we observe that the relative weight of each factor to
explain early exit differs among countries. Nevertheless in most countries,
2See for instance Brown (1999)
3Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and USA
4Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece,
Switzerland and Belgium
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Table 1: Reasons for early retirement for 11 European countries
Reasons for early exit Number of observations Frequency (in %)
Early retirement windows 589 33.95
Layoff 271 15.62
Own ill health 520 29.97
Ill health of a relative 43 2.48
Retire at same time as spouse 65 3.75
To spend more time with family 133 7.67
To enjoy life 114 6.57
Total 1735 100
Note: Our sample contains all retired individuals aged between 55 and 69 in 2006 who
were not entitled to a public or private pension when they left their activity
Source: SHARE (waves 2004 and 2006)
more than one third individuals state that they left early their job after they
received early retirement windows from their employer. This fraction is par-
ticularly high in Netherlands, in Germany, in Switzerland in Belgium or in
France. In contrast, in Austria, Sweden or Spain, it is rather a bad health
condition that represents the major part of the reasons for early exit.
It may be argued that the high fraction of individuals reporting an early
exit due to financial incentives payed by their employer may result from a
simple justification bias. The respondents could invoke that reason to justify
their decision of leaving early their job. To address this empirical issue we
select in a second step only retired individuals in 2006 who were working in
2004. These respondents were asked in 2004 the following question: ”Think-
ing about your present job, would you like to retire as early as possible?”.
This measure provides us a good measure of the individual propensity to
early retirement and it has been already used in other empirical studies to
examine the factors of early retirement (Debrand and Blanchet, 2007, Siegrist
et al., 2007). So we group the respondents into two categories: the group 1
is made up of respondents who answered ”Yes” to this question that we view
as workers with high propensity to early retirement and the group 2 includes
individuals who answered ”No”. For each group, we study the reasons for
early exit. In the table 2, we remark that the fraction of respondents who
mention early retirement windows as a motivation for early exit does not dif-
fer across groups, so the justification bias appears to be negligible when we
study the incidence of early retirement windows in the individual retirement
decision. Consequently, descriptive statistics of the figure are robust to a jus-
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Figure 1: Reasons for early exit by countries
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7
tification bias. We observe that in France, the incidence of early retirement
windows amounts to around 40% of early exits, which explains the willing
of the French government to discourage these practices by setting a tax on
the whole amount of financial incentives offered by employers to their older
workers.
Table 2: The reasons for early exit according to the propensity to early
retirement of respondents
Frequency (in %)
Reasons for early exit Group 1 Group 2
Early retirement windows 45.54 45.31
Layoff 13.39 9.38
Own ill health 11.61 7.81
Family reasons 16.07 28.13
To enjoy life 13.39 9.38
Total 100 100
Note: Our sample contains all individuals retired in 2006 aged between 55 and 69 in
2006 who were not entitled to a public or private pension when they left their activity
and who were employed in 2004
Lecture: The group 1 includes agents with an high propensity to early retirement. The
group 2 includes individuals with a low propensity to early retirement
Source: SHARE (waves 2004 and 2006)
3 The model
3.1 The economy
Following the specification of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we consider
an economy in which firms produce one type of good using only one factor of
production: the labor. For a sake of simplicity, we assume that a firm can not
employ more than one worker and the number of jobs is endogenous. Follow-
ing Behaghel (2007), we consider two age groups of workers: the middle-age
workers (group C1) and the older workers (group C2). A middle-age worker
may switch to the next age group at a Poisson arrival rate η1. Similarly, an
older worker may reach the mandatory retirement age at a Poisson arrival
rate η2.
In our model the Poisson arrival rate η2 is a key parameter to determine
the horizon of older workers denoted by H. We define H in the following
8
way:
H =
∫ +∞
0
tη2e
−η2tdt =
1
η2
In the remainder of the paper we view an increase in the mandatory retire-
ment age as a decrease in η2.
We consider an economy ”a` la” Mortensen Pissarides (1994) with en-
dogenous job creation and destruction. In this model, workers and firms
with vacant jobs meet each other according to a matching function m(ui, vi),
that denotes the number of matches as a function of the unemployment rate
ui among the group Ci and the vacancy rate vi targeted to job-seekers be-
longing to the group Ci. Here the matching technology is age-discriminating,
which means that firms are free to target their hirings by age5. We also as-
sume that the matching function is increasing, concave in each argument and
linear homogeneous. Let θi be the labor market tightness namely the number
of vacancies per worker, so we can define the Poisson arrival rate q(θi) of a
match for an employer posting a vacancy targeted to job seekers belonging
to the group Ci.
q(θi) =
m(ui, vi)
vi
= m(
1
θi
, 1) i = 1, 2 (1)
Therefore q(θi) is a decreasing function of the tightness θi. Furthermore we
can define the Poisson arrival rate p(θi) of a match for a job seeker belonging
to the group Ci:
p(θi) =
m(ui, vi)
ui
= θiq(θi) i = 1, 2 (2)
So p(θi) is an increasing function of the tightness θi. Consequently, θi is an
endogenous key variable to determine the job-finding rates of each age group
of workers in our economy.
3.2 The firms’ behaviour
In our model each firm has one job that can be either filled and producing
or vacant and searching. As long as the job is vacant, firms pay a cost c
of maintaining a vacancy. When the vacancy is matched with a worker, his
idiosyncratic productivity y is drawn randomly from the fixed distribution
G() with  ∈ [0, ]. The firm hires the worker if  is higher than the produc-
tivity threshold ci . Consequently, 
c
i is an other endogenous key variable to
determine the hiring rate of each age group of workers.
5This assumption holds in a setting of weak legislation prohibiting age-discrimination
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Let J iv be the value to an employer of posting a vacancy targeted on
workers belonging to the group Ci. At steady-state, we obtain the following
Bellman equations:
rJ iv = −c+ q(θi)[
∫ 
0
max{Ji(x), 0}dG(x)− J iv] i = 1, 2 (3)
where Ji() is the asset value of a job filled by a worker belonging to the
age group Ci with a productivity level . Under the free-entry condition, the
flow value to the employer from opening a new vacancy is equal to zero at
steady-state equilibrium. Therefore we get :∫ 
ci
Ji(x)dG(x) =
c
q(θi)
i = 1, 2 (4)
This first condition implies that the mean search cost must be equal to the
value to an employer of a filled job. An increase in this value encourages
therefore employers to open more vacancies.
When a job is filled, a worker belonging to the age group Ci starts pro-
ducing an output y, where  is the random component of the productivity,
and he receives a productivity-contingent wage wi(). Then the job can be
hit by an idiosyncratic shock at a Poisson arrival rate λ. In that case, a new
random productivity level  is drawn according to a cumulative distribution
function G(x) and the employer has no other choice either to close down the
job or to keep the worker. Existing filled jobs are destroyed if the productiv-
ity level falls below a productivity threshold di . Consequently, a job occupied
by a worker belonging to the age group Ci may be destroyed at a Poisson
arrival rate λG(di ). We assume that λ does not differ across age groups so
di is a key endogenous variable to determine job destruction among each age
group of workers.
In our model, we allow employers to offer their older workers early re-
tirement windows to encourage them to leave their job and to avoid a layoff.
As we mentioned in the introduction, this firm’s behavior is the response of
employers to the tightening of access conditions for publicly financed early re-
tirement schemes and an increasingly part of employers offer early retirement
windows since the early 2000’s. Consequently, in our model, we consider that
the firing cost for an employer depends on the age of the worker. If an em-
ployer fires a middle-age worker, he has to pay him severance pay denoted
by f1 according to the French Employment Protection Legislation. However,
if an employer fires an older worker, he offers him early retirement windows
denoted by f2. Reproducing the 2003 French pension reform, we set a tax
levied on the amount of the early retirement window payed by the employer
at a rate τ .
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We can discuss the motivations that lead employers to offer early retire-
ment windows to their older workers rather than firing them. To justify
our specification, we argue that the legislation regarding firing older work-
ers implies a cumbersome and often costly procedure for employers. Indeed,
studying more than 300 court rulings of the Court of Cassation during the pe-
riod 1994-2004 regarding job separations for older workers, Amauger-Lattes
and Desbarrats (2006) highlight the fact that the 2003 French pension reform
has not increased layoffs but it has encouraged dismissals. They explain this
phenomenon stating that employers strike a mutual agreement with their
older workers, offering them generous early retirement windows and report-
ing a ”dismissal for serious misconduct”, although it is not the case. Conse-
quently, we consider two ways for an employer to get rid of his older worker:
either he offers him early retirement windows or he waits for his worker to
reach mandatory retirement age. In that second case, the employer has to
pay the worker a retirement allowance fr.
In addition, recall that in our model a middle-age worker may switch to
the next age group at a Poisson arrival rate η1. In that case, if his random
component of productivity  is lower than the productivity threshold d2, his
job breaks up. So for each age group of workers Ci (i ∈ 1, 2), the value to an
employer of hiring a worker with a random component of productivity level
equal to  is defined by the following Bellman equations:
rJ1() = y− w1() + λ[
∫ 
0
max{J1(x),−f1}dG(x)− J1()]
+η1[max{J2(),−f2(1 + τ)} − J1()] (5)
And:
rJ2() = y− w2() + λ[
∫ 
0
max{J2(x),−f2(1 + τ)}dG(x)− J2()]
+η2[(J
2
v − fr)− J2()] (6)
3.3 Rent-sharing rules
We assume that the wage is set to split the match surplus between the firm
and the worker at all times and in fixed proportions, as in the case of a
standard Nash wage bargaining. The worker’s share is β. In a setting of
employment protection, we have to consider two rent-sharing rules. Indeed,
when a worker is matched with a vacancy, no severance payment has to be
paid if negotiation fails. However, following the standard model of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), we assume that wages are renegotiated continuously so
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that the wage received by a worker accounts for the employment protection
he will benefit from in the case of a layoff. So, we may define a first rent-
sharing rule when the worker is hired, that determines a potential wage w0i
in the following way:
w0i () = argmax{[Wi()− Ui]β[Ji()](1−β)} i = 1, 2 (7)
where Wi() is the flow value to a worker belonging to the age group Ci from
employment and Ui is the flow value to an unemployed worker belonging
to the age group Ci. Solving the program (7), we get the following first
rent-sharing rule:
Wi()− Ui = βS0i () = β[Ji() +Wi()− Ui] (8)
where S0i () is the match surplus from a job creation targeted to workers
belonging to the age group Ci. As the wage is assumed to be renegotiated
immediately, we get the new maximization program:
wi() = argmax{[Wi()−Ui−fi]β[Ji()+fi(1+τi)](1−β)} with τ1 = 0 and τ2 = τ
(9)
Solving (9) we get the following rent-sharing rule:
Wi()− Ui − fi = βSi() = β[Ji() + τifiWi()− Ui] (10)
We remark that a job filled by a middle-age worker breaks up if J1() ≤
−f1 which implies W1 ≤ U1 + f1. In a similar way, a job filled by an older
worker breaks up if J2() ≤ −f2(1 + τ), which implies W2 ≤ U2 + f2.
Let us first define the flow value from employment to a worker of the group
Ci. When he is hired and as long as his job is not hit by an idiosyncratic
shock, he receives the productivity-contingent wage wi(). When a shock
occurs at a Poisson arrival rate λ, the productivity level changes and the
worker may be fired. In that case he receives a payment from his employer fi
(f1 corresponding to severance payment and f2 corresponding to the amount
of the early retirement window received). If he remains employed despite the
shock, he receives a new wage wi(), which changes the value of his job Wi().
Furthermore, a middle age-worker occupying a job with a random component
of productivity level equal to  may switch to the next age group at a Poisson
arrival rate η1 and if his job does not break up he benefits from the discounted
income flows an older worker derives from the same job. Similarly, an older
worker may reach the mandatory retirement age at a Poisson arrival rate η2
and then his job breaks up and he receives a retirement allowance fr. In that
case, the worker is retired and he benefits from a pension P discounted over
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an infinity of time. So for each age group of workers, the flow value from
employment to a worker satisfies the following Bellman equations:
rW1() = w1() + λ[
∫ 
0
max{W1(x), U1 + f1}dG(x)−W1()]
+η1[max{W2(), U2 + f2} −W1()] (11)
and:
rW2() = w2() + λ[
∫ 
0
max{W2(x), U2 + f2}dG(x)−W2()]
+η2[(fr + U3)−W2()] where rU3 = P (12)
Furthermore, we determine the present flow value from unemployment
to a worker belonging to the age group Ci, denoted by Ui by the following
equation:
rUi = zi+p(θi)[
∫ 
0
max{W 0i (x), Ui}dG(x)−Ui]+ηi(Ui+1−Ui) i = 1, 2 (13)
where zi is the non-labor income received by an unemployed worker be-
longing to the age group Ci. It is noteworthy that an older unemployed
worker who retires does not receive any retirement allowance fr.
In the appendix (7.1), we determine the wage equations for each age group
of workers:
w1() = (1− β)z1 + β(y+ cθ1 − η1f2τ) + f1(r + η1)− η1f2 (14)
w2() = βy− (1− β)z2 − βcθ2 + (r + η2)[f2(1 + βτ)]− η2fr (15)
We observe first that the wage received by a worker belonging to the
group Ci is an increasing function of the non-labor income zi and of the
probability to be matched with a job p(θi), given that these variables raise
the worker’s threat point, allowing him to extract a higher share of the match
surplus from wage bargaining. Furthermore, we remark that the wage of a
middle-age worker decreases with the amount of firing costs f2 and that the
wage received by an older worker decreases with the amount of retirement
allowance fr. These results are consistent with Lazear’s findings (1990) that
show that the higher the employment protection of a worker the lower his
wage has to be in the beginning of his career.
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3.4 Job destruction and job creation at steady-state
As we already mentioned in the subsection (3.2), in the case of a shock on
a job, the employer has no other choice either to retain his worker with
the new value of , the random component of productivity drawn from a
distribution G(x), or to fire the worker. In the appendix 7.2, we determine
two productivity thresholds, below which firms close down existing filled jobs.
yd1 = z1 +
βc
1− β θ1 − λ
∫ 
d1
S1(x)dG(x)− η1 max{S2(d1), 0}+ η1f2τ (16)
and:
yd2 = z2 +
βc
1− β θ2 − λ
∫ 
d2
S2(x)dG(x)− (r + η2)f2τ (17)
We observe that the productivity threshold is less than the opportunity
cost of employment, composed of non-labor income zi and of the expected
gain to search for a job. Indeed, the third term on the right-hand side of (16)
and (17) represents the option value of retaining an existing match despite
a shock. This labor-hoarding phenomenon is due to the fact that firms are
faced with a positive cost of maintaining a vacancy and therefore they accept
to incur a loss in anticipation of a future improvement in the value of the
match’s product6.
Regarding the effects on employment protection in the case of the workers
belonging to the group C1, we draw the same conclusions as Lazear (1990):
any severance payment arrangement is neutral on the firing decision of firms
through an optimal labor contract, in which a worker is willing to pay a fee
when he signs the contract to buy the protection of his job. In a similar way,
the amount of retirement allowance fr is also neutral on the firing decision
of firms regarding the older workers.
Furthermore in the case of the older workers, we observe that the amount
of early retirement window payed by the firm f2 has a negative impact on the
threshold productivity d2. This may be due to the fact that a third agent,
the government, receives a part of this payment through a tax at a rate τ ,
which implies that the worker is not given the whole payment when he is
fired: in that case, following the Lazear’s theory (1990), firing incentives are
distorted. Indeed, as firms expect that firing older workers is more costly,
they are more reluctant to close down their jobs. However, we also observe
a threshold effect regarding the younger cohort of workers, in the sense that
6this type of labor-hoarding behavior has been well investigated by Mortensen Pis-
sarides (1994)
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firms have interest to lay middle-age workers off before they switch to the
next age group 7.
Regarding hiring rate of each age group of workers, we determine the
productivity threshold ci below which the employer does not recruit an un-
employed worker belonging to the group Ci, so S
0
i (
c
i) = 0. Using (8) and
(10), we deduce:
Si() = S
0
i () + fiτi with τ1 = 0 and τ2 = τ (18)
Using the expression (18) we determine the productivity threshold ci as
a function of di :
ci = 
d
i + (r + ηi + λ)fiτi i = {1, 2} (19)
Consequently, an increase in the firing costs fi reduces the hiring rate of
the workers belonging to the group Ci, only if the tax rate τi is higher than
0. Furthermore, the free-entry condition (4) and the two rent-sharing rules
(8) and (10) imply:
(1− β)
∫ 
ci
S0i (x)dG(x) =
c
q(θi)
(20)
At steady-state equilibrium, θ2 and 
d
2 solve the following equation system:
c
q(θ2)
= (1− β) ∫ 
c2
[
y(x−d2)
(r+η2+λ)
− f2τ ]dG(x)
yd2 =z2 +
βc
1−βθ2 − λ(r+η2+λ)
∫ 
d2
[y(x− d2)]dG(x)− (r + η2)f2τ
yc2 = y
d
2 + (r + η2 + λ)f2τ
As the first and the second equation describe respectively a downward-
sloping and an upward-sloping curve, there exists one unique solution (θ2, 
d
2)
to this problem.
Regarding the workers belonging to the age group C1, there may be two
cases, depending on whether their job may break up when they are ageing or
not. In the case 1, the worker keeps his job even though he switches to the
next age group. It implies that the reservation productivity d1 is higher than
d2. Determining the match surplus in appendix 7.3, we show that (˜
d
1, θ˜1)
solves the following equation system:
c
q(θ˜1)
= (1− β) (r+η1+η2+λ)
(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
∫ 
˜d1
y(x− ˜d1)dG(x)
y˜d1 =z1 +
βc
1−β θ˜1 − λ(r+η1+η2+λ)(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
∫ 
˜d1
y[x− ˜d1]dG(x)− η1y ˜
d
1−d2
(r+η2+λ)
+ η1f2τ
7for similar results, see Behaghel (2007)
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In the case 2, the worker does not keep necessarily his job when he
switches to the next age group. It implies that d1 ≤ d2. Determining the
match surplus in appendix 7.3 we show that (ˆd1, θˆ1) solves the following
equation system:
c
q(θˆ1)
= (1−β)
(r+η1+λ)
∫ 
ˆd1
y(x− ˆd1)dG(x) + (1− β) η1(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
∫ 
d2
[y(x− d2)]dG(x)
yˆd1 = z1 +
βc
1−β θˆ1 − λ(r+η1+λ)
∫ 
ˆd1
[y(x− ˆd1)]dG(x)− λη1(r+η1+λ)
∫ 
d2
[
y(x−d2)
(r+η2+λ)
]dG(x) + η1f2τ
In the appendix 7.4 we show that the equilibrium solves either the first
system or the second. Furthermore as in each system the two first equations
describe respectively a downward-sloping and an upward-sloping curve, we
deduce that there exists one unique solution, that may be either the couple
(˜d1, θ˜1) or the couple (ˆ
d
1, θˆ1).
3.5 Unemployment at steady-state equilibrium
We determine the equilibrium values of the unemployment rate ui and the
vacancy rate vi among each group of workers, using two sets of steady-state
conditions. The first implies that, for each age group Ci of workers, the labor
force Ni is constant so we get:
N0η0 = N1η1 = N2η2 (21)
These two equations characterize N1 and N2 for exogenous values of N0,
η0, η1 and η2. The second condition implies that for each age group, the
flow of workers out of unemployment equals the flow of workers back into
unemployment:
λG(di )(1− ui)Ni +Ni−1ηi−1ui−1 = p(θi)uiNi[1−G(ci)] + ηiuiNi (22)
So combining (21) and (22), we determine the unemployment rate ui in
the following way:
ui =
λG(di ) + ui−1ηi
λG(di ) + p(θi)[1−G(ci)] + ηi
(23)
As p(θi) is an increasing function of θi and therefore of the vacancy rate
vi, we find the expression of the Beveridge curve
8 for each generation of
workers, that is an inverse relation between vacancy and unemployment rate.
Furthermore, defining the labor market tightness at steady-state equilibrium,
we find an other relation between ui and vi such that vi = θiui. Therefore the
equilibrium unemployment exists and is unique, at the intersection between
the Beveridge Curve and the increasing curve whose equation is vi = θiui.
8see notably Blanchard et al. (1989)
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4 The effect of the 2003 French pension re-
form on hiring and job separation rates by
age group of workers
To study the effect of a tax on early retirement windows payed by firms
combined with an increase in the mandatory retirement age on hiring and job
separation rates by age, we make some assumptions regarding the functional
forms of the matching function and of the distribution of the component 
of the productivity levels. First, we assume that matching function is Cobb-
Douglas such that:
m(ui, vi) = u
α
i v
α
i
where α is the elasticity of the matching function. Furthermore, we assume
that i follows an uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1].
In this section, we study in a first subsection the effect of an increase in
the tax rate τ on hiring and job separation rates of older workers. Then,
we examine the effect of an increase in the mandatory retirement age in a
setting of a taxation of early retirement windows, to investigate the effect
of the combination of both these reforms on transition rates among older
workers. In a second subsection, we investigate the effect of an increase in
the tax rate τ on job finding and separation rates among middle-age workers,
then we examine the effect of a combination of this tax with an increase in
the mandatory retirement age on these rates.
4.1 A qualitative analysis for older workers
Under the assumptions defined in the beginning of this section, we determine
the job creation condition C2 and the job destruction condition D2 such that:
C2(θ2, 
d
2, τ, η2) =
(1−β)y
2(r+η2+λ)
(1− d2 − (r+η2+λ)f2τy )2 − cθα2 = 0
D2(θ2, 
d
2, τ, η2) = z2 +
βc
(1−β)θ2 − λy2(r+η2+λ)(1− d2)2 − (r + η2)f2τ − yd2 = 0
Let C2i and D
2
i be respectively the partial derivatives of C
2 and D2 with
respect to their i-th argument. Differentiating this equations system with
respect to d2, we obtain: 
∂d2
∂τ
=
C23D
2
1−D23C21
D22C
2
1−C22D21
∂d2
∂η2
=
C24D
2
1−D24C21
D22C
2
1−C22D21
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We show in the appendix (7.5) that an increase in τ reduces job separa-
tion rates among older workers, which is consistent with previous Behaghel’s
findings.
Then, we examine the effect of a decrease in η2 that we view as an in-
crease in the mandatory retirement age on separation rates, in a setting of a
taxation of early retirement windows at a rate τ 6= 0. We show that in that
case, delaying mandatory retirement age has two offsetting effects on the
productivity threshold d2. On the one hand, an increase in the mandatory
retirement age raises the option value of the employer to retain an existing
match despite a shock, given that the employer expects a higher duration of
his job9. This first effect reinforces the labor-hoarding effect of the tax and
reduces job destruction holding all other things fixed.
On the other hand in the case of a high tax rate τ , an increase in the
mandatory retirement age may encourage employers to dismiss their older
workers, offsetting therefore the dissuasive effect of the tax. The idea is
the following: in the case of a high taxation of early retirement windows,
an employer has interest to retain his older worker, even though the present
value of his job to the employer is negative after a productivity shock. Indeed,
as long as the loss in profits does not exceed the separation costs due to the
tax, the employer prefers waiting for his worker to reach the mandatory
retirement age. In this setting, when the government raises the mandatory
retirement age, the horizon along which the firm will incur loss in profits is
longer and the employer may have interest to dismiss his older worker earlier,
offering him early retirement windows. This impatience effect of firms will
therefore raise job separations among older workers, offsetting the initial
labor-hoarding effect of the tax.
Consequently, the effect of postponing retirement on job separations among
older workers is ambiguous and depends widely on the tax rate τ . Indeed the
higher the tax rate, the more likely employers to accept to incur important
loss in profits, waiting for their workers to reach the mandatory retirement
age and the stronger the impatience effect after an increase in the mandatory
retirement age.
Proposition 1. For values of the tax rate τ sufficiently high such that τ >
τ c =
2λy(1−d2)2
f2[2(r+η2+λ)]2
, then ∂d2/∂η2 < 0.
Proof: Computing the partial derivative ∂d2/∂η2, we deduce the following
condition:
∂d2
∂η2
< 0⇔ D24 < 0
9See also Che´ron et al. (2007) for similar results
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In the appendix (7.5), we determine D24, and we find a critical value of the tax
rate τ c, above which delaying retirement may lead to raise the productivity
threshold d2:
τ c =
2λy(1− εd2)2
[2(r + η2 + λ)]2f2
(24)
First, we observe that the critical value τ c falls when the amount of the
early retirement window f2 is high. Indeed, this tax is levied on the whole
amount of financial incentives payed by the employer to his older worker.
Consequently, the higher the amount of early retirement window the more
likely an increase in mandatory retirement age to offset the labor-hoarding
of the tax.
Second, we remark that τ c is a decreasing function of the productivity
threshold d2. So, in the setting of a high job separation rate of older workers,
delaying retirement may lead to more dismissals among this age group of
workers.
Third, τ c also decreases with η2. We deduce that in the case where the
mandatory retirement age is initially low, increasing this age may encourage
employers to get rid of their older workers.
Furthermore, a rise in the productivity threshold d2 may lead to reduce the
hiring rate of older workers, all other things being equal and may therefore
attenuate and even offset the positive horizon effect due to an increase in
the mandatory retirement age. So we have to determine to what extent a
combination of a tax on early retirement windows and of an increase in the
mandatory retirement age affects the tightness θ2. Differentiating the job
destruction condition (D2) and the job creation condition (C2) with respect
to θ2 we get: 
∂θ2
∂τ
=
D23C
2
2−C23D22
D22C
2
1−C22D21
∂θ2
∂η2
=
D24C
2
2−C24D22
D22C
2
1−C22D21
We show in the appendix (7.5) that an increase in the tax rate τ reduces
θ2. This is a first perverse effect of a partial employment protection targeted
to older workers already highlighted by Behaghel (2007). In addition, recall
that job creation is increasing with θ2 but it is also decreasing with the
productivity threshold c2 = 
d
2 +(r+η2+λ)f2τ . Consequently, an increase in
the tax rate τ also raises c2, which reinforces the negative effect of an increase
in τ on the job finding rate of older workers.
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Furthermore, even though delaying retirement encourages the creation of
jobs targeted to older workers through an horizon effect, we have showed
that for a high tax rate τ , such that τ ≥ τ c, this reform may increase d2.
This impatience effect may reduce the present value to an employer of a job
filled by an older worker making firms more reluctant to hire older workers.
Consequently, we highlight the fact that at some values of the tax rate τ an
increase in the mandatory retirement age reduces job creation among older
workers.
Proposition 2. For a high value of the tax rate τ , such that τ > τ cc where
τ cc =
y{(1−εd2)[(r+η2)+λεd2]+(1−εd2)2}
f2(r+η2+λ)[λ(1−εd2)+(r+η2+λ)]
, then ∂θ2/∂η2 > 0.
Proof: see appendix (7.5)
In addition, recall that the job finding rate of older workers also depends
on the productivity threshold c2 = 
d
2 + (r+ η2 + λ)(f2τ/y). It is noteworthy
that even though τ > τ c, which implies ∂d2/∂η2 < 0, 
c
2 does not necessarily
rise after an increase in retirement age. Indeed, calculating the derivative of
c2 with respect to η2 we get the following expression :
∂c2
∂η2
=
∂d2
∂η2
+ (f2τ/y) (25)
This expression may be negative only if − ∂d2
∂η2
> (f2τ/y). The right-hand
side of this inequality is due to the fact that after an increase in retirement
age, the expected duration of a job is higher, so an employer may be less
reluctant to hire an unemployed worker aged 55-59 years.
Let Π2 be the job finding rate among older workers, we define Π2 in the
following way :
Π2 = θ
1−α
2 [1− d2 − (r + η2 + λ)
f2τ
y
]
Determining the partial derivative of Π2 with respect to η2, we obtain the
following expression :
∂Π2
∂η2
= θ−α2 [(1− α)
∂θ2
∂η2
(1− c2)− θ2(
∂d2
∂η2
+
f2τ
y
)]
Although this expression seems to be complicated, its sign depends strongly
on the tax rate τ . We highlight three cases. In the first case, the tax rate is
so low that τ < τ c and an increase in the mandatory retirement age raises
unambiguously the job finding rate of an unemployed older worker. In the
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second case, the tax rate belongs to the interval [τ c, τ cc]. In this case, an
increase in mandatory retirement age leads to a rise in d2 but also in the
tightness θ2. Consequently if the impatience effect is sufficiently high, then
∂Π2/∂η2 > 0 which means that delaying mandatory retirement age reduces
the job finding rate of an unemployed older worker. But it is the reverse
story if the horizon effect dominates the impatience effect.
Last but not least if the tax rate τ is higher that the critical value τ cc,
then delaying retirement increases the productivity threshold d2 and reduces
simultaneously the tightness θ2, leading unambiguously to a fall in the job
finding rate of an older job-seeker.
4.2 A qualitative analysis for middle-age workers
As mentioned in the previous section, we have to distinguish two cases: the
case 1, where max{S2(d1), 0} = S2 and the case 2 where max{S2(d1), 0} = 0.
In the case 1, the tightness θ1 and the productivity threshold 
d
1 are defined
at equilibrium by the following equations system:
C1(θ1, 
d
1, τ, η2, 
d
2) = −cθα1 + (1−β)(r+η1+η2+λ)y2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ) (1− d1)2
D1(θ1, 
d
1, τ, η2, 
d
2) = −yd1 + z1 + βcθ1(1−β) − λ(r+η1+η2+λ)y2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)(1− d1)2 − η1y
d1−d2
(r+η2+λ)
+ η1f2τ
And in the case 2, the tightness θ1 and the productivity threshold 
d
1 are
defined at equilibrium by the following equations system:
C1(θ1, 
d
1, τ, η2, 
d
2) = −cθα1 + (1−β)y2(r+η1+λ) [1− d1]2 +
(1−β)η1y
2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
[1− d2]2
D1(θ1, 
d
1, τ, η2, 
d
2) = −yd1 + z1 + βcθ1(1−β) − λy[1−
d
1]
2
2(r+η1+λ)
− η1y
2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
[1− d2]2 + η1f2τ
We observe that in the case 1, the job creation condition does not depend
on d2, contrarily to the case 2. This difference is noteworthy notably when we
study the effect of an increase in the tax rate τ on the productivity threshold
d1. We show in the appendix (7.5) that in the case 1, an increase in τ raises
d1 if the following condition holds:
η1f2 > − η1y
(r + η2 + λ)
dd2
dτ
(26)
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality represents the direct
effect of an increase in τ on the firing rate of middle-age workers, already
highlighted by Behaghel (2007). Indeed, if it is more costly for an employer
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to get rid of an older worker, he has interest to lay his worker off before he
switches to next age group. The right-hand side of the inequality represents
the indirect effect of an increase in τ . Indeed, given that an increase in the
tax rate reduces job destruction among older workers, so it raises the present
value to the employer of a job filled by a middle-age worker who will switch
to the next age group. Consequently, in the case of a shock on a job, firms
have interest to retain the existing match.
Furthermore, in the case 2, we obtain in the appendix (7.5) a sufficient
condition such that an increase in τ raises d1:
η1f2αcθ
α−1
1 > −
η1y
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[1− d2]
dd2
dτ
[αcθα−11 − βc] (27)
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality represents the direct
effect and the term on the right-hand side corresponds to the indirect effect.
Contrarily to the condition (26), the direct effect and the indirect effect have
not necessarily opposite signs. Indeed, if the bargaining power of workers is
too high, such that β > αθα−11 , then the inequality (27) is necessarily true.
The idea is the following. If β is too high, then the decrease in d2 raises θ1,
leading to a strong increase in wage and it may encourage employers to lay
more middle-age workers off. However, if we assume that β is relatively low,
such that β < αθα−11 , then in the case 1 or in the case 2, an increase in τ
leads to a rise in d1 provided that the direct effect offsets the indirect effect
(through the fall in d2).
In addition, we show in the appendix (7.5) that in the case 1, the effect
of an increase in the mandatory retirement age on d1 depends on the sign of
the following expression:
dd1
dη2
> 0⇔ 2η1(r + η1 + λ)y
[2(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)]2
(λαcθα−11 − βc)
+αcθα−11 [η1y
(d1 − d2)
(r + η2 + λ)2
+
η1y
r + η2 + λ
dd2
dη2
] > 0 (28)
The first term of this sum corresponds to the direct effect, that reduces
job destruction among middle-age workers if β < λαθα−11 . Indeed if the
bargaining power is too high, then delaying mandatory retirement age may
raise the job finding rate of middle-age workers, increasing therefore wages
and encouraging employers to close down more jobs hit by a shock. However,
if β is relatively low, a decrease in η2 raises the option value of retaining an
existing match in the case of a shock.
The second term corresponds to the indirect effect that depends directly
on the tax rate τ . Indeed, we have previously shown that a decrease in η2
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raises job destruction among older workers if τ > τ c. In that case, a firm
employing a middle-age worker expects his job is more likely to break up
when he will switch to the next age group, which makes his employer more
reluctant to retain his job in the case of a negative productivity shock.
It is the same story in the case 2. Indeed, we show in the appendix (7.5)
that the effect of a decrease in η2 on 
d
1 depends on the sign of the following
expression:
2(r + η1 + λ)η1y
[2(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)]2
[1− d2]2[αcθα−11 − βc]
+
η1y
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[1− d2][αcθα−11 − βc]
dd2
dη2
(29)
We find again both direct and indirect effects. Consequently, under the
condition β < αθα−11 , delaying retirement raises the option value to the em-
ployer to retain an existing match but this direct effect may be attenuated if
τ > τ c.
Now, we investigate the effect of an increase in τ on the tightness θ1 in
the case 1. We show in the appendix (7.5) that an increase in τ reduces θ1
under the following condition:
η1f2 > − η1y
r + η2 + λ
dd2
dτ
(30)
This condition ensures that an increase in τ raises job destruction among
middle-age workers. Consequently, as d1 = 
c
1, a rise in 
d
1 reduces the job
finding rate of middle-age workers.
We draw similar conclusions in the case 2. Indeed in the appendix (7.5),
we show that an increase in τ reduces θ1 under the following condition:
−(1− β)y
(r + η1 + λ)
[1−d1]η1f2+
η1y
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[1−d2][αcθα−11 −βc]
dd2
dτ
< 0
(31)
So provided that β is sufficiently low, such that β < αθα−11 , then the
hiring rate of middle-age workers decreases with τ only if the direct effect
through the increase in c1 offsets the indirect effect through the fall in 
d
2.
In addition, we have to determine the effect of an increase in the manda-
tory retirement age on the tightness θ1. In the appendix (7.5), we show that
it has a positive direct effect on θ1. Nevertheless, a decrease in η2 may lead
to more separations among older workers and therefore to an increase in d1,
if the tax rate τ is higher than τ c. In that case, this indirect effect raises
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c1 and attenuates therefore the direct positive effect of an increase in the
mandatory retirement age on θ1.
To sum up our findings, we have shown that in the case of an high taxation
of early retirement windows, an increase in the mandatory retirement age
may encourage employers to close down more jobs hit by idiosyncratic shocks
which attenuates the positive horizon effect on job creation. To investigate
the magnitude of these effects and to study their impact on employment rate
among both age groups of workers, we implement a numerical illustration.
5 A numerical illustration
5.1 The effects of an increase in the mandatory retire-
ment age on hiring and separation rates for both
age groups of workers
For this numerical illustration, we consider two age groups of workers : the
workers aged 55-59 years and the workers aged 50-54 years. Considering that
one period is a year, we set initially η1 = η2 = 0.2, so the average duration
of each age group equals 5 years and the mandatory retirement age is set to
60 before the 2003 French pension reform.
This numerical illustration aims at determining the magnitude of the
effects of an increase in the mandatory retirement age raising from 60 to 65,
namely a decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1, on the job finding and separation
rates among each group of workers, for different values of the tax rate τ . The
values chosen for this numerical illustration are reported in the table 3.
A first set of parameters Φ1 = {α, β, λ, r, z1, z2, f1, f2} is based on external
information. For the values of the elasticity of the matching function α we
choose α = 0.5 as in the standard literature. The bargaining power of workers
β is set to 0.5 so that the Hosios’ condition (1990) holds. The annual interest
rate r is set to 3%. The amounts of unemployment benefits z1 and z2 are
computed from the values of the average wages of each group of workers.
Using empirical results of Aubert (2005) drawn from a firm-level survey called
DADS (De´claration Annuelle des Donne´es Sociales) for the year 2001, we set
the gross hourly wage of a worker aged 50-54 to 16 euros and the gross hourly
wage of a worker aged 55-59 to 17 euros. We determine therefore the gross
yearly average wage for each group of workers, considering a basis of 35 hours
per week. We obtain w1 = 29121 euros and w2 = 30941 euros. Setting a
replacement rate to 50% we deduce that z1 = 14561 euros and z2 = 15471
euros.
We consider age-dependent firing costs. In the case of a layoff of a worker
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aged 50-54 years, the employer has to give him severance payment according
to the French Employment Legislation. We have shown previously that this
payment had no effect on the hiring or firing behavior of firms. Regarding
the 55-59 years old, we assume that employers prefer dismissing a worker
invoking the serious misconduct and paying him early retirement window f2
as highlighted by Amauger-Lattes and Desbarats (2006). A little is known
about this payment so we set it in a first step to 50% of the yearly gross wage
(f2 = 15470.5 euros) and in a second step we implement a sensitivity analysis
to check whether our results are robust to different values of f2. Similarly, as
we expect that our results are sensitive to the value of the Poisson arrival rate
of idiosyncratic shock λ, we compute the effects of an increase in mandatory
retirement age on transition rates for different values of this parameter. So
we will distinguish three cases. In the case 1, the benchmark case, f2 is set
to 15470.5 euros and λ is set to 0.2. In the case 2, f2 is set to only 25% of
the average wage so f2 = 7735.25 and λ remains unchanged. In the case 3,
f2 is equal to its value in the benchmark case but λ = 0.4, a higher value
than in our baseline case.
Lastly, we choose to calibrate a second set of parameters Φ2 = {y, c}
to reproduce some stylized facts about hiring and separation rates among
workers aged 55-59 years. According to the French Labor Force Survey for
the years 2001 and 2002, the job finding rate of an unemployed worker aged
55-59 equals 6.14%. In addition, the job separation rate for this cohort of
workers equals 9.29%. Solving our model using these values, we obtain an
average productivity of job y equal to 30213 and a cost of maintaining a
vacancy c equal to 43931 euros. Using the French Labor Force Survey for
the years 2001 and 2002, we remark that these values allow us to match in
a satisfying way the observed job finding and job destruction rates among
the workers aged 50-54. Indeed, solving the equations system composed of
the job creation and the job destruction condition for the workers aged 50-
54 setting c = 43931 and y = 30213, we obtain a job finding rate equal to
17.25% and a job destruction rate equal to 6,25% for this group while the
observed rates equal respectively 17.08% and 3.55% according to the French
Labor Force Survey 2001-2002 (cf figure 2). In addition, the expression of
the steady-state unemployment rate (23) shows that the employment rate
among the group C1 of workers depends on the employment rate among the
previous cohort of workers. According to the French Labor Force Survey, we
set the employment rate among workers aged 45-49 years to 81.21%. From
the steady-state expression (23), we compute employment rates and we see
that the values obtained are close to those observed from the data. Indeed,
we find an employment rate equal to 77.33% among the 50-54 years old and
equal to 60.98% among the workers aged 55-59, while the observed rates
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equal respectively 75.71% and 57.77%.
Table 3: Values of parameters
Elasticity of the matching function α 0.5
Bargaining power β 0.5
Poisson arrival rate of shocks λ 0.2
Annual interest rate r 0.03
Workers aged between 50 and 54
Unemployment benefits
(as a fraction of the average wage) z1 50%
Probability to switch to the next age group η1 0.1
Workers aged between 55 and 59
Unemployment benefits
(as a fraction of the average wage) z2 50%
Early retirement windows (as a fraction of the average wage) f2 50%
Probability to reach the mandatory retirement age η2 0.2
Calibrated values
Cost of maintaining a vacancy c 43931
Average productivity y 30213
From this numerical illustration, we seek to highlight the effect due to
a tax on early retirement windows offered by firms, when the mandatory
retirement age rises. We focus first on the workers aged 55-59 years. We
observe in the figure 3 that in the case where early retirement windows are
not taxed, the labor-hoarding effect of delaying mandatory retirement age is
very low. Indeed, focussing first on the red curve, corresponding to the case
1 where f2 = 15470.5 and λ = 0.2, for τ = 0 a decrease in η2 from 0.2 a`
0.1 reduces by less than 1% the firing rate of the workers aged 55-59 years.
We also remark that this labor-hoarding effect is offset by the impatience
effect highlighted in this paper, when the tax rate τ rises. For instance, for
a tax rate equal to 50%, as it is the case in France after the 2008 reform (an
extension of the 2003 reform), an increase in mandatory retirement age from
60 to 65 may increase job separation rate for the workers aged 55-59 years
by 5%.
Our results are qualitatively robust to other values of f2 and λ. Never-
theless, in the case 2 where f2 is twice lower than in the benchmark case, the
increasing dashed blue curve is flatter than the red curve. So in this setting,
an increase in the retirement age leads to a rise in job destruction among the
workers aged 55-59 years for a higher value of the tax rate than in the case 1.
In addition in the case 3, we see that the green circled curve is as steep as the
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Figure 2: Job creation, job destruction and employment among the workers
aged between 50 and 54 over the period 2001-2002
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Lecture: The job finding rate is the fraction of workers aged 50-54 unemployed in 2001
who find a job in 2002
The firing rate is the fraction of workers aged 50-54 employed in 2001 who get into
unemployment in 2002
Source: French Labor Force Survey (2001-2002)
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Figure 3: The effect of a decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1 on job flows among
each age group of workers for different values of the tax rate τ
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Lecture: Each graph represents the relative variation in job flows after a decrease in η2
from 0.2 to 0.1 as a function of the tax rate τ .
The red curve corresponds to the case 1 (benchmark case) where λ = 0.2 and
f2 = 15470.5. The dashed blue curve corresponds to the case 2 where f2 = 7735.25 and
λ = 0.2. The circled green curve corresponds to the case 3 where f2 = 15470.5 and
λ = 0.4.
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red curve, but the value of the tax rate above which delaying retirement age
raises firings among the workers aged 55-59 years is higher than in the case
1. This result is due to the fact that the labor-hoarding effect of an increase
in mandatory retirement age in absence of a tax on early retirement windows
is sharply higher in the case 3 than in the case 1. However, the higher the
tax rate τ and the lower is this effect which is consistent with our theoretical
findings.
Furthermore, we remark in the figure 3 that delaying retirement strongly
encourages job creation among the workers aged 55-59 years. Indeed, without
a tax on early retirement windows, a decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1 raises the
job finding rate of these workers by more than 35%. We remark that this
effect is weakly sensitive to the tax rate τ . Nevertheless, it can appear to be
surprising to obtain increasing curves regarding the cases 1 and 2 (red and
dashed blue curves). We would expect that the higher the impatience effect
the lower is the horizon effect. However, recall that the effect of a decrease
in η2 on the job creation threshold 
c
2 is ambiguous and is defined by the
expression (25). We observe that the higher the tax rate τ , the higher the
second term of the derivative and therefore delaying retirement may reduce
the threshold productivity c2 while it raises the threshold 
d
2. In addition
we observe that in the case 3, when the Poisson arrival rate λ is higher
than in the benchmark case, if the tax rate is sufficiently high the horizon
effect decreases with τ which yields an inverted U-shaped circled green curve.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of all these effects is close to zero and appear
to be negligible. We conclude that the positive horizon effect exerted by an
increase in the retirement age on the job finding rate of workers aged 55-59
years is very strong whatever the value of the tax rate τ .
Then we investigate the effect of delaying retirement age on job flows
among the workers aged 50-54 years. We see first that increasing the manda-
tory retirement age may reduce job destruction rate among this group of
workers by more than 11% in the benchmark case. This labor-hoarding ef-
fect is weakly sensitive to the value of the tax rate τ . Indeed, even though
the tax rate is set to τ = 0.5, the relative variation in the firing rate after
an increase in retirement age equals −10% very close to −11%. And if f2
is lower than in the benchmark case (blue dashed curve) the effect of the
tax on this labor-hoarding effect appear to be negligible. Nevertheless, when
looking at the circled green curve, it is noteworthy that the labor-hoarding
effect may be attenuated by a taxation of early retirement windows in a sig-
nificative way when the Poisson arrival rate λ is sufficiently high. Indeed,
in absence of taxation, a decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1 reduces firing rate
among workers aged 50-54 years by 10%. When τ is set to 0.5, the same
reform reduces the job destruction rate among these workers by only 7%.
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Regarding the job creation among the 50-54 years, we see that delaying
retirement strongly increases job finding rates. Indeed, for τ = 0 a decrease
in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1 increases the job finding rate by 21% in the benchmark
case. However, when the tax rate τ is set to 50% we see that this horizon
effect falls from +21% to +18%. So we conclude that in the case of a taxation
of early retirement windows, the initial horizon effect exerted by an increase
in retirement age on job creation may be attenuated in a significative way.
However, when we look at the blue dashed curve corresponding to the case
2 where the value of f2 is lower, we see that this result is true only for
sufficiently high values of the amount of early retirement windows.
5.2 The effects of an increase in retirement age on em-
ployment rates among both age groups of workers
Using the expression (23) of the steady-state unemployment rate among the
age group of workers Ci, we deduce the effects of an increase in retirement
age on employment rates and we investigate to what extent a taxation on
early retirement windows alters this effect.
Focussing first on the workers aged 50-54 years, we observe in the figure 4
that in the absence of taxation of early retirement windows, a decrease in η2
from 0.2 to 0.1 leads to a rise in employment rate by 3.8% in the benchmark
case. In the case 1, when the tax rate is as high as 50%, delaying retirement
still raises employment rate by 3.4%. So a high taxation of early retirement
windows may attenuate by 10% the positive effect exerted by an increase in
retirement age on employment rate among workers aged 50-54 years. This
attenuation may be less important for lower values of f2 (the dashed blue
curve is quite flatter than the red curve) but it may be more important for
higher values of λ holding f2 at this benchmark value. Indeed, in the case
3, we see that for τ = 0 the relative variation in employment rate after a
decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1 is +4.6% and it drops to +3.8% for τ = 0.5, so
high values of the tax rate τ may attenuate the positive effect of a increase
in retirement age on employment rate among workers aged 50-54 years by
17%.
Then when we investigate the effect of an increase in retirement age on
employment rate among the workers aged 55-59 years, we see that the tax
rate τ plays a more important role. Using the expression (23), we observe
that a decrease in η2 exerts a direct negative effect on employment rate
among workers aged 55-59 years. Indeed, when the mandatory retirement
age raises, it leads to reduce flows out of unemployment regarding job seekers
aged 55-59 years. In addition, a decrease in η2 may have indirect effects on
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Figure 4: The effect of a decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1 on employment rates
among each age group of workers
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Lecture: Each graph represents the relative variation in steady-state employment rates
after a decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1. as a function of the tax rate τ .
The red curve corresponds to the case 1 (benchmark case) where λ = 0.2 and
f2 = 15470.5. The dashed blue curve corresponds to the case 2 where f2 = 7735.25 and
λ = 0.2. The circled green curve corresponds to the case 3 where f2 = 15470.5 and
λ = 0.4.
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the employment rate. First, it may have a positive effect on employment
through an increase in the job finding rate of workers aged 55-59 years. But
this horizon effect may be partially offset by the impatience effect for high
values of the tax rate τ . Indeed, in this setting, delaying retirement age leads
to a rise in job destruction among the workers aged 55-59 years, which exerts
a negative effect on the employment rate among this group of workers.
We see in the figure 4 that in the absence of a taxation of early retirement
windows, a decrease in η2 from 0.2 to 0.1 reduces by 2.5% the employment
rate among workers aged 55-59 years. In that case, even though the direct
effect of a decrease in η2 on employment dominates, it is strongly attenuated
by the horizon effect and therefore, the decrease in employment rate after
an increase in retirement age is quite low. However, for a tax rate τ equal
to 50%, the impatience effect exerts a supplementary negative impact on
the employment rate. Consequently, after an increase in retirement age, the
employment rate falls by 4%. So in the case of a high taxation of early
retirement windows, the decrease in the employment rate that results from
an increase in retirement age is twice higher than in the case where early
retirement windows are not taxed. We deduce therefore that the combination
of a rise in the mandatory retirement age and of a taxation of the financial
incentives to retire payed by firms to their workers aged 55-59 years may
have perverse effects on employment among this age group of workers.
6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to study the effects of postponing retirement in a
setting of an age-specific employment protection on the hiring and separation
rates of older workers and also on employment of the elderly. Reproducing
the 2003 French pension reform, we set a tax levied on early retirement
windows payed by firms to their older workers to dismiss them. We provide
some theoretical findings considering a matching model with endogenous
destruction extended to account for a mandatory retirement age.
We highlight that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement
may raise separations among the targeted age group of workers through an
impatience effect. Indeed, a high tax rate discourages firms from dismissing
older workers paying them financial incentives, so employers prefer waiting for
their workers to reach the mandatory retirement age. In this setting, delaying
retirement forces employers to retain their workers for a longer time, and they
could be interest to dismiss them before they reach the retirement age in
spite of the cost induced by the tax. We point out that there exists a critical
value of the tax rate above which the impatience effect offsets the labor-
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hoarding effect of postponing retirement. Calibrating our data using the
French Labor Surveys for the years 2001 and 2002, we show that this critical
value is negatively correlated to the amount of early retirement windows but
it is positively correlated to the Poisson arrival rate of idiosyncratic shocks.
Nevertheless, for reasonable values of these parameters, the relative variation
in the job separation rate among the targeted age group of workers after an
increase in the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 65 equals to -1% in the
absence of taxation on early retirement windows and to 5% in the case where
the tax rate equals 50%.
In addition, the impatience effect that we highlight in this paper may
partially offset the positive impact of an increase in the retirement age on
the hiring rate of these workers. Theoretically, we determine a second critical
value of the tax rate above which delaying retirement reduces the hiring rate
among the group of workers targeted by the tax. However, we see in our
numerical illustration that the extent to which the tax rate influences the
effect of postponing retirement on the job finding rate is negligible.
Consequently, the relative variation in the employment rate among the
workers targeted by the tax strongly depends on the taxation level. Indeed,
in the case of a high tax rate delaying retirement leads to more separations,
which exerts a perverse effect on the employment.
Similarly, regarding the previous cohort of workers, we show theoretically
that the impatience effect may affect the impact of delaying retirement on
the firing and the hiring rates but we show in our numerical illustration
that the role of the impatience effect may be quite significative only for
high values of the Poisson arrival rate of idiosyncratic shocks. Consequently,
the relative variation in the employment rate among this cohort of workers
after an increase in the mandatory retirement age is sensitive to the tax
rate on early retirement windows only if the Poisson arrival rate of shocks is
sufficiently high.
However, these results have to be considered with caution. Indeed, in our
model we consider an exogenous and constant amount of early retirement
windows, while we can expect that the amount offered by the employer to his
worker depends on the characteristics of this worker. Too few informations
are still available about these early retirement windows, however since the
2008 reform, an employer who offers such financial incentives to his older
workers have to indicate their names, their ages and the amount that they
received prior to exit. Using this data, we could carry out an empirical study
aiming at better understanding the factors that lead employers to offer such
financial incentives and the determinants of the amount offered. We leave
this issue for further investigation.
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7 Appendix
7.1 The wage equations
Using the sharing rule (10) and rearranging terms, we obtain:
−(r+ηi+λ)(1−β)Ui = (r+ηi+λ)[β[Ji()+Wi()]−Wi()+fi(1+βτi)] (32)
Let us first define the wage equation for the middle-age workers belonging
to the age group C1. Bellman equations (5) and (11) imply:
−(r+η1+λ)(1−β)U1 = β[y+λ
∫ 
d1
S1(x)dG(x)+λU1+η1 max{S2(), 0}+η1(U2−f2τ)]
−w1()−λ
∫ 
d1
[W1(x)−U1−f1]dG(x)−λ(U1+f1)−η1 max{W2()−U2−f2, 0}−η1(U2+f2)
+(r + λ+ η1)f1 (33)
Using the sharing-rule (10) we obtain:
λβ
∫ 
d1
S1(x)dG(x) = λ
∫ 
d1
[W1(x)− U1 − f1]dG(x)
And:
βmax{S2(), 0} = max{W2()− U2 − f2, 0}
Therefore we get:
−(r + η1 + λ)(1− β)U1 = βy− w1()− U1λ[1− β]
−(1− β)η1(U2 + f2)− η1β[f2(1 + τ)] + f1(r + η1) (34)
Substituting the Bellman equation (13) into this expression, we obtain:
−(1− β)[p(θ1)[
∫ 
0
max{W1(x), U1}dG(x)− U1] + z1] = β
−w1()− (1− β)η1f2 − η1β[f2(1 + τ)]− λf1 (35)
Combining the rent-sharing rule (8) and the free-entry condition (4) we
get: ∫ 
ci
[W1(x)− U1]dG(x) = β
(1− β)
c
q(θ1)
(36)
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So, substituting this expression into (35), we deduce the following wage
equation:
w1() = (1− β)z1 + β(y+ cθ1 − η1f2τ) + f1(r + η1)− η1f2 (37)
Then we determine the wage equations for the older workers belonging
to the group C2. Substituting Bellman equations (6) and (12) into the ex-
pression (10), we get:
−(r + η2 + λ)(1− β)U2 = β{y+ λ
∫ 
d2
S2(x)dG(x) + λ(U2 − f2τ) + η2P
r
}
−w2()− λ
∫ 
d2
[W2(x)− U2 − f2]dG(x)− λ(U2 + f2)− η2(P
r
+ fr)
+(r + η2 + λ)f2(1 + βτ) (38)
The rent-sharing rule (10) implies:
λβ
∫ 
d2
S2(x)dG(x) = λ
∫ 
d2
[W2(x)− U2 − f2]dG(x)
Therefore we get:
−(r + η2 + λ)(1− β)U2 = βy− w2()− U2λ[1− β]− (1− β)η2P
r
−η2fr + (r + η2)[f2(1 + βτ)] (39)
Substituting the Bellman equation (13) into this expression and rearrang-
ing terms, we obtain:
−(1− β)[z2 + p(θ2)[
∫ 
0
max{W2(x), U2} − U2]dG(x)] = βy− w2()
+(r + η2)[f2(1 + βτ)]− η2fr (40)
Using the sharing rule (8) and the free-entry condition (4), we deduce the
following wage equation:
w2() = βy− (1− β)z2 − βcθ2 + (r + η2)[f2(1 + βτ)]− η2fr (41)
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7.2 The productivity thresholds
We have to determine the productivity threshold di , below which the firm
closes down the job filled by a worker belonging to the group Ci. First we
define d1. Substituting the wage equation (14) into the expression (5) we get:
(r + η1 + λ)J1() = (1− β)[y− z1]− βcθ1 − f1(r + η1 + λ) + η1f2(1 + βτ)
+λ
∫ 
d1
[J1(x) + f1]dG(x) + η1 max{J2() + f2(1 + τ), 0} − η1f2(1 + τ)
Simplifying this expression we obtain:
(r + η1 + λ)S1()(1− β) = (1− β)[y− z1]− βcθ1 − (1− β)η1f2τ
+λ(1− β)
∫ 
d1
S1(x)dG(x) + η1(1− β) max{S2(), 0} (42)
Evaluating (42) at  = d1 gives the following productivity threshold:
yd1 = z1 +
βc
1− β θ1 − λ
∫ 
d1
S1(x)dG(x)− η1 max{S2(d1), 0}+ η1f2τ (43)
We proceed in a similar way to determine d2, substituting the wage equa-
tion (15) into the expression (6) we get:
(r+η2+λ)J2() = (1−β)[y−z2]−βcθ2−f2(1+τ)(r+η2)+(1−β)(r+η2)f2τ
+λ
∫ 
d2
[J2(x) + f2(1 + τ)]dG(x)− λf2(1 + τ)
Simplifying this expression we obtain:
(r + η2 + λ)(1− β)S2() = (1− β)[y− z2]− βcθ2 + (1− β)f2τ(r + η2)
+λ(1− β)
∫ 
d2
S2(x)dG(x) (44)
So evaluating (44) at  = d2, we get the following job destruction condi-
tion:
yd2 = z2 +
βc
1− β θ2 − λ
∫ 
d2
S2(x)dG(x)− (r + η2)f2τ (45)
Furthermore, rent-sharing rules (8) and (10) imply:
Si() = S
0
i () + fiτi τ1 = 0, τ2 = τ (46)
So using (46) we can deduce the productivity threshold ci , such that:
ci = 
d
i + (r + ηi + λ)fiτi (47)
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7.3 Match surpluses
Given that S2(
d
2)0, we get:
S2()− S2(d2) =
y(− d2)
r + η2 + λ
(48)
Furthermore, in the case where d1 > 
d
2, given that S1(
d
1) = 0, we obtain:
(r + η1 + λ)[S˜1()− S˜1(d1) = y(− d1) + η1[S2()− S2(d1)] (49)
The expression (48) allows us to simplify this expression so we get:
S˜1() =
y(− d1)
(r + η1 + λ)
(1 +
η1
r + η2 + λ
) (50)
In the case where d1 ≤ d2, in a similar way we obtain:
Sˆ1() =
y(− d1)
(r + η1 + λ)
+
η1
r + η1 + λ
max{ y(− 
d
2)
(r + η2 + λ)
, 0} (51)
7.4 The equilibrium for the middle-age workers
In the case 1, where max{S2(d1), 0} = S2(d1), an unique equilibrium (˜d1, θ˜1)
is defined by the following equation system:
c
q(θ˜1)
= (1− β) (r+η1+η2+λ)
(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
∫ 
˜d1
y(x− ˜d1)dG(x)
y˜d1 =z1 +
β
(1−β)cθ˜1 − λ(r+η1+λ)(1 +
η1
(r+η2+λ)
)
∫ 
˜d1
y(x− ˜d1)dG(x) + η1f2τ − η1y (˜
d
1−d2)
(r+λ+η2)
And in the case 2, where max{S2(d1), 0} = 0, an unique equilibrium
(ˆd1, θˆ1) is defined by the following equation system:
c
q(θˆ1)
= (1−β)
(r+η1+λ)
∫ 
ˆd1
y(x− ˆd1)dG(x) + (1− β) η1(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
∫ 
d2
y[x− d2]dG(x)
yˆd1 =z1 +
β
(1−β)cθˆ1 −
λ
∫ 
ˆ
d1
y(x−ˆd1)dG(x)
(r+η1+λ)
− η1
(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
∫ 
d2
y(x− d2)dG(x) + η1f2τ
So, we have to show that the equilibrium for the younger generation is
either the couple (˜d1, θ˜1) or the couple (ˆ
d
1, θˆ1). In other words, we have to
show that there can be neither 0 solutions nor 2 solutions to this problem. We
borrow the proof of Behaghel (2007). Indeed, if the problem had 0 solutions,
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it would imply : ˜d1 < 
d
2 < ˆ
d
1. So subtracting the two job creation conditions
each other we would get:
c
q(θ˜1)
− c
q(θˆ1)
=
(1− β)
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[(r+η1 +η2 +λ)
∫ d2
˜d1
y(x− ˜d1)dG(x)
+η1[y
d
2−y˜d1](1−G(d2))]+
(1− β)
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[(r+η2+λ)
∫ ˆd1
d2
y(x−˜1)dG(x)
+(r + η2 + λ)[yˆd1 − y˜d1](1−G(ˆd1))] > 0 (52)
Therefore, we deduce that θ˜1 > θˆ1.
Furthermore, subtracting the two job destruction conditions each other
we would get:
β
(1− β)c(θ˜1−θˆ1) = (y˜
d
1−yˆd1)+λ[
∫ 
˜d1
(yˆd1 − y˜d1)dG(x)
(r + η1 + λ)
+
η1y
∫ 
˜d1
(d2 − ˜d1)dG(x)
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
]
+η1y
(˜d1 − d2)
(r + η2 + λ)
⇔ β
(1− β)c(θ˜1 − θˆ1) = (y˜
d
1 − yˆd1)[1−
λ(1−G(˜d1))
(r + η1 + λ)
]
+
η1y(˜d1 − d2)
(r + η2 + λ)
[1− λ(1−G(˜
d
1))
(r + η1 + λ)
] < 0 (53)
So we deduce that θ˜1 < θˆ1. This result is not possible given the previous
result, so it is the proof that there exists at least one solution to the problem.
Furthermore, we proceed in a similar way to show that the problem does
not admit two solutions. Indeed, if he admitted two solutions, it would imply:
˜d1 > 
d
2 > ˆ
d
1. In that case, the equation (52) would imply θ˜1 < θˆ1 and the
equation (53) would imply θ˜1 > θˆ1, so this case is absurd. Consequently, the
problem admits one unique solution: either the couple (˜d1, θ˜1) if 
d
1 > 
d
2, or
the couple (ˆd1, θˆ1) if 
d
1 < 
d
2.
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7.5 Effects of the tax rate and the retirement age on
hiring and separation rates among older workers
We determine the partial derivatives of the job creation condition:
C21 = −cαθ(α−1)2 < 0
C22 =
−(1−β)
(r+η2+λ)
[y(1− εd2)− (r + η2 + λ)f2τ ] < 0
C23 = −(1− β)f2[1− εd2 − (r+η2+λ)f2τy ] < 0
C24 =
−2(1−β)y
[2(r+η2+λ)]2
(1− εd2 − (r+η2+λ)f2τy )2 − f2τ (1−β)(r+η2+λ) [1− εd2 −
(r+η2+λ)f2τ
y
] < 0
Then we determine the partial derivatives for the job destruction condi-
tion: 
D21 =
βc
(1−β) > 0
D22 =
λy
(r+η2+λ)
(1− εd2)− y = −[(r+η2)y+λyε
d
2]
(r+η2+λ)
< 0
D23 = −(r + η2)f2 < 0
D24 =
2λy
[2(r+η2+λ)]2
(1− εd2)2 − f2τ
We examine the effect of an increase in τ on d2:
dεd2
dτ
=
(C23D
2
1 −D23C21)
(D22C
2
1 − C22D21)
< 0
Then we investigate the effect of a decrease in η2 (namely an increase in
the mandatory retirement age) on d2:
dεd2
dη2
=
(C24D
2
1 −D24C21)
(D22C
2
1 − C22D21)
We know that: C24D
2
1 < 0 and C
2
1 < 0. So if D
2
4 < 0 then
dεd2
dη2
< 0. We
have to study the sign of D24:
D24 =
2λy
[2(r + η2 + λ)]2
(1− εd2)2 − f2τ
Consequently, a sufficient condition such that D24 < 0 may be expressed
as follows:
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2λy
[2(r + η2 + λ)]2
(1− εd2)2 − f2τ < 0
⇔ τ > 2λy(1− ε
d
2)
2
[2(r + η2 + λ)]2f2
Now, we determine the effect of an increase in τ on the tightness θ2:
dθ2
dτ
=
D23C
2
2 − C23D22
(C21D
2
2 −D21C22)
D23C
2
2 − C23D22 =
(1− β)
(r + η2 + λ)
[y(1− εd2)− (r + η2 + λ)f2τ ](r + η2)f2 −
(1− β)f2[1− εd2 −
(r + η2 + λ)f2τ
y
]
(r + η2)y + λyε
d
2
(r + η2 + λ)
Factorizing this expression by (1−β)
(r+η2+λ)
we deduce that its sign is the same
as the sign of the following expression:
[y(1−εd2)−(r+η2+λ)f2τ ](r+η2)f2−f2[1−εd2−
(r + η2 + λ)f2τ
y
][(r+η2)y+λyε
d
2]
Simplifying and rearranging terms, we find that this expression equals:
−f2λεd2y[(1− εd2)−
(r + η2 + λ)f2τ
y
] < 0
Then we determine the effect of an increase in the mandatory retirement
age on θ2:
dθ2
dη2
=
D24C
2
2 − C24D22
(C21D
2
2 −D21C22)
If D24 > 0, then
dθ2
dη2
< 0. However, if D24 < 0, then :
D24C
2
2−C24D22 = −[
2λy
[2(r + η2 + λ)]2
(1−εd2)2−f2τ ]
(1− β)
(r + η2 + λ)
[y(1−εd2)−(r+η2+λ)f2τ ]
−{ 2(1− β)y
[2(r + η2 + λ)]2
(1− εd2 −
(r + η2 + λ)f2τ
y
)2
+f2τ
(1− β)
(r + η2 + λ)
[1− εd2 −
(r + η2 + λ)f2τ
y
]} [(r + η2)y + λyε
d
2]
(r + η2 + λ)
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Factorizing by (1−β)
(r+η2+λ)
[(1− εd2)− (r+η2+λ)f2τy ] we deduce that this expres-
sion has the same sign as the following expression:
−y[ 2λy
[2(r + η2 + λ)]2
(1− εd2)2 − f2τ ]− f2τ
[(r + η2)y + λyε
d
2]
(r + η2 + λ)
− 2y
[4(r + η2 + λ)]
(1− εd2 −
(r + η2 + λ)f2τ
y
)
[(r + η2)y + λyε
d
2]
(r + η2 + λ)
The sign of this expression may be ambiguous given that at τ > τ c, 2λy
[2(r+η2+λ)]2
(1−
εd2)
2 − f2τ < 0. We can define a sufficient condition such that ∂θ2∂η2 > 0:
f2τ
[λy(1− εd2)]
(r + η2 + λ)
>
y2
2(r + η2 + λ)2
{(1− εc2)[(r + η2) + λεd2] + (1− εd2)2}
⇔ τ > y{(1− ε
d
2)[(r + η2) + λε
d
2] + (1− εd2)2}
f2(r + η2 + λ)[λ(1− εd2) + (r + η2 + λ)]
Effects of the tax rate and the retirement age on hiring
and separation rates among middle-age workers
We consider first the case 1 where max{S2(d1), 0} = S2(d1). We determine
the effect of an increase in τ and of a decrease in η2 on the productivity
threshold d1. Differentiating this equations system we find the two following
expressions: 
∂d1
∂τ
=
(C13D
1
1−D13C11 )+(C15D11−D15C11 )
dd2
dτ
D12C
1
1−C12D11
∂d1
∂η2
=
(C14D
1
1−D14C11 )+(C15D11−D15C11 )
dd2
dη2
D12C
1
1−C12D11
We determine the partial derivatives for the job creation condition:
C11 = −αcθα−11 < 0
C12 =
−(1−β)(r+η1+η2+λ)y
(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
(1− d1) < 0
C13 = 0
C14 =
−2η1(r+η1+λ)(1−β)y
[2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)]2
(1− d1)2 < 0
C15 = 0
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Then we calculate the partial derivatives for the job destruction condition:
D11 =
βc
(1−β) > 0
D12 =
−(r+η1+η2+λ)y[(r+η1)+λd1]
(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
< 0
D13 = η1f2 > 0
D14 = (1− d1)2 2η1(r+η1+λ)λy[2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)]2 + η1y
(d1−d2)
(r+η2+λ)2
> 0
D15 =
η1y
(r+η2+λ)
> 0
Consequently:
dd1
dτ
> 0⇔ η1f2 > − η1y
(r + η2 + λ)
dd2
dτ
Furthermore:
dd1
dη2
> 0⇔ 2η1(r + η1 + λ)y
[2(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)]2
(λαcθα−11 − βc)
+αcθα−11 [η1y
(d1 − d2)
(r + η2 + λ)2
+
η1y
r + η2 + λ
dd2
dη2
] > 0
We determine then the effect of an increase in τ and of a decrease in η2
on the tightness θ1. We obtain the following equations system:
dθ1
dτ
=
(D13C
1
2−C13D12)+(D15C12−C15D12)
dd2
dτ
C11D
1
2−D11C12
dθ1
dτ
=
(D14C
1
2−C14D12)+(D15C12−C15D12)
dd2
dη2
C11D
1
2−D11C12
Consequently:
dθ1
dτ
< 0⇔ η1f2 + η1y
r + η2 + λ
dd2
dτ
> 0
Furthermore:
dθ1
dη2
< 0⇔ (D14C12 − C14D12) +D15C12
dd2
dη2
< 0
As D14C
1
2 < 0, C
1
4D
1
2 > 0 and D
1
5C
1
2 < 0, so the direct effect implies that
a decrease in η2 raises θ1. The indirect effect through ∂
d
2/∂η2 may reinforce
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the direct effect if τ < τ c, but it may attenuate the direct effect if τ > τ c.
In a second step, we consider the case 2 where max{S2(d1), 0} = 0. We
calculate the partial derivatives for the job creation condition:
C11 = −αcθα−11 < 0
C12 =
−(1−β)y
(r+η1+λ)
[1− d1] < 0
C13 = 0
C14 = −[1− d2]2 2(1−β)η1y(r+η1+λ)[2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)]2 < 0
C15 =
−(1−β)η1y
(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
[1− d2] < 0
We also calculate the partial derivatives for the job destruction condition:
D11 =
βc
(1−β) > 0
D12 =
y[−(r+η1)−λd1]
(r+η1+λ)
< 0
D13 = η1f2 > 0
D14 =
2(r+η1+λ)η1y
[2(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)]2
[1− d2]2 > 0
D15 =
η1y
(r+η1+λ)(r+η2+λ)
[1− d2] > 0
We determine first the effect of an increase in τ and of a decrease in η2 on the
productivity threshold d1. Differentiating our equations system, we obtain
the two following expressions:
dd1
dτ
=
(C13D
1
1−D13C11 )+(C15D11−D15C11 )
dd2
dτ
D12C
1
1−C12D11
dd1
dη2
=
(C14D
1
1−D14C11 )+(C15D11−D15C11 )
dd2
dη2
D12C
1
1−C12D11
We determine a sufficient condition under which an increase in the tax rate
τ raises d1:
η1y
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[1− d2]
dd2
dτ
[αcθα−11 − βc] + η1f2αcθα−11 > 0 (54)
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Furthermore,
dd1
dη2
has the same sign as the following expression:
2(r + η1 + λ)η1y
[2(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)]2
[1− d2]2[αcθα−11 − βc]
+
η1y
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[1− d2][αcθα−11 − βc]
dd2
dη2
Then, we determine the effect of an increase in τ and of a decrease in η2
on the tightness θ1. We obtain the two following expressions:
dθ1
dτ
=
(D13C
1
2−C13D12)+(D15C12−C15D12)
dd2
dτ
C11D
1
2−D11C12
dθ1
dη2
=
(D14C
1
2−C14D12)+(D15C12−C15D12)
dd2
dη2
C11D
1
2−D11C12
Consequently, an increase in τ leads to a fall in the tightness θ1 if the following
condition holds:
−(1− β)
(r + η1 + λ)
[1−d1]η1f2+
η1y
(r + η1 + λ)(r + η2 + λ)
[1−d2][αcθα−11 −βc]
dd2
dτ
< 0
(55)
Furthermore, regarding the effect of a decrease in η2 on θ1, we draw similar
conclusions as in the case 1.
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